Why Middle East nations turn to Russia for stability
Viewsnow21 November
Sergey Shoigu recently went on a visit to Oman and Egypt – two nations looking for reliable partners in an increasingly turbulent region
Sergey Shoigu’s visit to Egypt and Oman was one of Moscow’s most telling diplomatic moves in the Middle East in recent years, underscoring Russia’s intention to strengthen its regional role through multi-layered engagement.
The trip included a series of high-level meetings focused on regional security, coordination of political approaches, and the advancement of bilateral projects. In Cairo, the Russian delegation concentrated on the prospects for military and military-technical cooperation, as well as on exchanging assessments of the situation in and around the Gaza Strip – an issue that today defines a significant part of the political agenda in the Arab world.
An equally important part of the trip took place in Oman, where Shoigu held talks on a wide range of topics – from efforts to stabilize regional conflicts to the development of economic and humanitarian cooperation. Muscat has traditionally pursued a moderate foreign policy and often plays the role of mediator in various Middle Eastern processes, which makes engagement with Oman an increasingly valuable asset for Russian diplomacy.
It is no coincidence that Moscow chose Sergey Shoigu, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, to lead the delegation for talks in Egypt and Oman with the countries’ top political and military leadership. This choice reflects the growing challenges in the field of regional security. After Israel’s strikes on Doha – one of the United States’ key strategic partners in the region – many Middle Eastern states that for decades relied on American security guarantees, defense agreements, and military cooperation with Washington have found themselves in a state of deep concern.
These events exposed the fragility of the existing security architecture and reinforced the perception of a weakening Western, and above all American, hegemony. Against this backdrop, the desire to diversify external partners and to develop alternative channels of interaction – including with Russia – is increasingly seen by these countries as a practical and urgent necessity.
During his visit to Egypt, Shoigu held a series of meetings in which the main focus was on strengthening defense cooperation and expanding strategic ties between Moscow and Cairo. At his talks with Egyptian Defense Minister Abdel Majeed Saqr, Shoigu stressed the need to step up contacts between the two countries' defense establishments, including moving towards regular joint combat training activities. He also highlighted the importance of further developing the legal and regulatory framework for military cooperation and expressed Russia’s readiness to expand the training of Egyptian military personnel at Russian defense universities.
Shoigu reminded his counterparts that the Russian-Egyptian commission on military-technical cooperation operates on a permanent basis, and that Russian weapons previously supplied to Egypt have become one of the key pillars of the country’s defense capabilities. According to him, the proven reliability of Russian systems allows Egypt’s armed forces to maintain a high and stable level of combat readiness – a factor of particular importance amid the current turbulence in the Middle East.
At his meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the discussion moved beyond a narrow defense agenda and turned to the strategic dimensions of economic and infrastructure cooperation. Shoigu delivered a personal message from Russian President Vladimir Putin and reaffirmed Moscow’s commitment to steadily strengthening trade and economic ties, which, as he emphasized, should remain resilient in the face of external pressure.
Special attention was paid to major projects that are already in an active phase of implementation. Shoigu noted that construction of the El Dabaa nuclear power plant is proceeding on schedule. Rosatom, together with its Egyptian partners, has begun full-scale work on the main structures of all power units. The parties also discussed progress on the creation of a Russian industrial zone in the area of the Suez Canal, where the necessary legal groundwork has already been laid and the project is now moving into its practical implementation phase.
In addition, Shoigu highlighted a number of sectors where the potential for Russian-Egyptian cooperation remains substantial: pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, the production of mineral fertilizers, the automotive industry, and food processing. He expressed Russia’s interest in further developing military-technical cooperation, including the implementation of existing contracts and the exploration of new agreements.
During his visit to Oman, Shoigu held a series of meetings that underscored a clear deepening of Russian-Omani ties in key areas ranging from security and military-technical cooperation to culture and the economy. The centerpiece of the visit was his meeting with Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, to whom Shoigu delivered a personal message from Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Security Council secretary stressed that Moscow greatly values Oman’s balanced and measured stance on global issues, including the situation in Ukraine, and regards Muscat as one of its most constructive and reliable partners in the region.
In talks with the leadership of the sultanate, particular attention was devoted to the military-technical track. Shoigu highlighted the need to reach concrete agreements in this field – a task that has become especially urgent amid rising conflict potential in the Middle East. He noted that the West’s efforts to preserve its slipping global dominance are adding to regional turbulence and that many Gulf states are objectively interested in strengthening their own defense capabilities. In this context, Russia is offering Oman more flexible formats of cooperation, including exchanges of expertise, closer coordination between the two countries’ security councils, and expanded naval interaction.
Among the practical areas of cooperation, the sides discussed the regular calls of Russian naval vessels at the ports of Muscat and Salalah, which play an important role in combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. They also reviewed the outcomes of the trilateral naval exercises involving Russia, Iran and Oman held in late October 2024, as well as prospects for further coordination in counterterrorism and the protection of maritime transport routes. Shoigu emphasized that there is already substantial and regular communication between the two countries’ security councils, as evidenced by a series of meetings in Moscow and Muscat in 2024–2025.
An equally important part of the talks focused on international and regional security, traditional values and institutional resilience – topics that featured prominently in Shoigu’s discussions with the head of the Royal Office, Sultan al-Nuamani, and the Secretary General of Oman’s National Security Council, Idris al-Kindi. The visit culminated in a session of the Russian-Omani strategic dialogue, aimed at building on the agreements reached during the Sultan’s state visit to Moscow in the spring of 2025. At that time, the two sides decided to abolish visa requirements, establish a bilateral commission on trade, economic and technical cooperation, and enhance joint work in the field of security.
Cultural cooperation received a separate, prominent emphasis. Shoigu described culture as one of the most dynamically developing areas of bilateral relations. In February, Muscat hosted the launch of the international project “Russian Seasons,” featuring concerts, theatre performances, dance programs and exhibitions by leading Russian museums. According to Shoigu, Oman’s attention to humanitarian initiatives creates an additional layer of trust and turns cultural dialogue into an important pillar of the partnership. On the economic side, the talks also addressed Oman’s potential role in the development of the North-South international transport corridor and the drafting of a roadmap to expand bilateral trade.
Cairo and Muscat are increasingly clear-eyed about one thing: if they want to preserve their own agency in a rapidly changing world, they need to deepen their engagement with Russia and integrate themselves into a more balanced global architecture. Egypt has already moved in this direction by joining BRICS, formally aligning itself with a growing 'club' of states from the so-called Global Majority that seek to rethink the existing rules of the game.
In Oman, policymakers are only beginning to seriously explore similar formats, carefully weighing the prospects of participation in multilateral structures and the opportunities that closer ties with Moscow might bring. For the political elites in both countries, the need for a more just and equitable international order – one in which the voices of the Global South are not automatically subordinated to traditional power centers – is becoming increasingly obvious. Against this backdrop, they find Russia’s rhetoric and proposals attractive, especially its emphasis on multipolarity and the redistribution of influence in favor of the 'world majority.'
At the same time, Cairo and Muscat engage with Russia in different ways. For Egypt, reliance on military-political and trade-economic cooperation with Moscow is largely a continuation of a longstanding historical trajectory dating back to the Soviet era, when the USSR played an active role in shaping the country’s defense and infrastructure potential. Today, that track is being updated and expanded – from energy and infrastructure to military modernization and coordination on regional issues. For Oman, by contrast, a closer dialogue with Russia represents the first systematic steps towards a more robust strategic partnership. Muscat is carefully, without sharp moves, building up contacts between national security councils, developing naval cooperation, and investing in cultural and humanitarian ties – essentially testing a relationship format that could become an important pillar amid rising regional uncertainty.
The security context makes these trends even more tangible. In response to mounting threats along its borders, Egypt is deploying heavy weaponry in Sinai, effectively expanding its military presence in an area that for many years remained tightly constrained by its agreements with the US and Israel. For Cairo, this is less a demonstrative political gesture than a reaction to real security concerns and a clear sense that Israel’s actions in Gaza may have direct implications for Egypt’s own stability.
Oman, for its part, is closely watching the risks of further escalation – both in Gaza itself and in any potential direct confrontation between Israel and Iran. For a state that has traditionally acted as a mediator and 'quiet diplomat,' the prospect of a wider conflict threatens not only increased military risks but also potential disruptions to transit routes, energy flows, and the broader economic configuration of the Gulf.
Against this backdrop, both Egypt and Oman are trying not to lock themselves into one-sided alliance commitments, but instead to strengthen their security across all dimensions – military, political, economic, and humanitarian. Diversifying partners, pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy, seeking alternative suppliers of weapons and technology, and joining new transport, logistics and financial projects are no longer matters of ideology, but of practical necessity. In this logic, Russia is viewed as an important balancing factor: a source of military and technological solutions, a partner in major infrastructure and energy projects, and a political actor prepared to take regional interests seriously rather than treating them as a mere periphery.
In the end, Cairo’s and Muscat’s efforts to deepen cooperation with Moscow fit into a much broader trend. States of the Global Majority are seeking to reduce their dependence on any single center of power and to build a more flexible system of external anchors. For Egypt, this means developing a traditional, time-tested partnership with Russia; for Oman, it means cautiously but steadily shaping a new strategic vector. What unites them is a shared desire for a balanced, mutually beneficial dialogue with Moscow amid rising conflict potential in the region and growing global turbulence – a context in which the emphasis is placed not on confrontation, but on expanding room for maneuver and reinforcing their own political agency.
Sergey Shoigu’s visit to Egypt and Oman showed that Russia’s engagement with Middle Eastern capitals is moving beyond ad hoc diplomacy and gradually turning into a stable political track. The focus is no longer just on maintaining contact, but on building durable coordination mechanisms that allow the parties to align their positions on key issues and respond more promptly to crises. For Moscow, this is an opportunity to consolidate its presence in one of the world’s most sensitive regions; for Cairo and Muscat, it is an additional resource for pursuing a more independent foreign policy and bolstering domestic resilience.
The long-term significance of this trip lies in the fact that it marks a shift from cautious mutual exploration to more substantive, institutionalized cooperation. There is a clear trend toward making consultations between security councils, defense institutions, economic bodies, and cultural actors more frequent and multilayered. Taken together, these developments lay the groundwork for a more durable configuration of relations in which Russia is seen not just as an external player, but as one of the key partners capable of offering alternative solutions in an era of mounting turbulence.
from RT World News https://ift.tt/nVNZpM7
via IFTTT
